The meaning of ‘America First’ foreign policy

The Trump administration’s greatest successes have been in the field of foreign policy. Although the “America First” principle, as it was put into practice, was manifested by presidential instinct, not bureaucratic mastery, it was the right response to America’s shrinking margin for geopolitical error: an exit from Afghanistan open; avoid wasting resources and attention on new conflicts on the periphery; punish free-riding allies; focus on competition with China; and seeking deals with America’s traditional adversaries. Donald Trump was the first president since Jimmy Carter who did not allow the US to become entangled in a new overseas conflict.

Some America First policies survived Trump’s first term. President Joe Biden has pushed through with our overdue departure from Afghanistan. The focus on China remained. But just six months after evacuating Kabul, his government energetically joined what has become a proxy war of attrition over Ukraine, reportedly ignoring diplomatic opportunities that could have shortened the conflict. It continues at unjustified costs to the Ukrainians, the U.S. Treasury and arsenal, and the prospects for strategic stability. Coupled with incoherent and destructive efforts to manage the crisis in the Levant, the White House has proven itself to be at the mercy of events and incapable of prioritizing. Government officials insisted that they could “walk and chew gum at the same time,” but all they really showed is that fiascos are easy when you are strategically blindfolded.

America first, can it last?

In the Republican Party, “America First” became a matter of slogans. Every candidate in the primary field used the phrase to highlight their foreign policy preferences. The failure of these challengers and President Trump’s choice of JD Vance as his running mate indicates that there is a strong constituency to turn the page on the Republican Party’s old interventionist foreign policy consensus.

Yet it remains uncertain whether the America First intuition of unilateral moderation can make the leap from mood to tradition. Some conservative analysts want to restore George W. Bush’s foreign policy, but this time with America First window dressing. But failure to adhere to the imperial definition of American interests, as promoted by the Democratic Party, would lead to disaster: at the ballot box it would fail to command the loyalty of the Republican base; internationally, it would overload America’s scarce resources on flashpoints in which the country has little direct interest. The Republican Party needs an America First foreign policy platform, not just a slogan.

The basis of that platform should be the acceptance of trade-offs: between domestic and international, and between competing international priorities. In this century, the US is not powerful enough to keep the republic free and prosperous while guaranteeing regional orders in Europe, the Middle East and Asia. The America First platform recognizes that America is endangered by the risk of physical harm from conflict over far-flung issues, by fiscal and social harm caused by the expulsion of its blood and treasure into wars of choice, and by the massive violation of its borders by lawless citizens. migrant flows.

America First focuses scarce resources on international obligations sufficient to protect America and avoids taking risks for luxury goals distantly related to the security needs of the American people. It pays attention to power balances in Europe and Asia, but rejects the de facto heuristic of the use of force of the foreign policy elite: reflexive defense of the global status quo. That approach will exhaust us and leave us in a weaker position to defend America when push comes to shove. Geographic remoteness and nuclear weapons provide us with an enormous degree of protection against disturbances in Eurasia. We have the privilege to wait and see – and we must take advantage of that.

An adequate foreign policy starts in the Western Hemisphere. The increase in illegal immigration in the Biden era has disrupted daily life across the country, increased our vulnerability to terrorist attacks and discredited legal pathways to residency. The administration has tended to view this as a distraction and was slow to respond because the issue jeopardized Vice President Harris’s election prospects. America First defines the border as a core national security priority, requiring a new policy of deterrence and completion of the wall.

America First emphasizes that the absence of geopolitical rivalry in America is critical to American security and international freedom of action. Geopolitical rivals now have more tools to penetrate the Western Hemisphere, and America’s progressive policies in post-Soviet Europe and the Indo-Pacific encourage them to do so. The America First platform should restore the Monroe Doctrine as the irreducible red line of American security, returning it to its dignified roots as a statement of defense and diplomacy, rather than as a license for military intervention. The teaching is a shield, not a lance. In the coming century we will need it to signal, negotiate and deter in defense of the republic.

Putting America first means ending our costly pursuit of luxury goals in the Middle East. America’s shrinking margin for geopolitical error means that continued deep involvement there is a direct trade-off for more important priorities in Asia and the preservation of national resources for the turbulent century ahead. The US has three important, but not vital, interests in the Middle East: ensuring that no local or external power dominates the region, stabilizing energy flows, and preventing terrorist attacks on Americans. For these purposes, a small regional air and naval contingent coupled with long-range strike capabilities is sufficient. Our vulnerable ground deployments in Iraq and Syria must be withdrawn. The US has an interest in blocking Iranian ambitions, but not to the point of war with Tehran. To take stock, the country must rely on the capable network of partnerships strengthened by the Abraham Accords. Successfully deprioritizing the Middle East will require flexibility to pivot as circumstances require. Local partners such as Israel and Saudi Arabia should remain partners and not become Article 5 allies. They should not suspect reflexive American support. When they adopt policies that harm American interests, we should not shy away from imposing costs on them.

The Ukraine factor

In Ukraine it is time for conversations, not for ideological wishes. The war has reached an impasse and can only end or pause through negotiations. The Biden administration’s policy of sending weapons without making them conditional on Ukrainian willingness to negotiate subordinates American interests to those of President Zelensky. The continuation and expansion of the war into Russia poses a continued risk of nuclear escalation, from which the American homeland is not immune. It has seriously damaged the prospects for a sustainable European settlement and deepened Europe’s dependence on the US at an age when our main geopolitical challenges are in Asia. It has also strengthened the Sino-Russian partnership – the international combination with the greatest capacity to threaten US interests – into a more coherent entente.

The US interest in ending the war and not restarting it far outweighs US interests in ultimately positioning the Russia-Ukraine border or imposing further costs on Russia. America First draws the cautious conclusion. Using its considerable military and economic influence, the US should seek to engage the warring parties and key European states in sustained talks on a ceasefire and final status issues such as the geopolitical alignment and reconstruction of Ukraine. The relative weakness of American interests on the issues that led to the war places a premium on the adequacy of shaping American objectives. An America First negotiating position would have to be willing to accept an agreement along the lines of the March 2022 Istanbul Communique: Ukrainian neutrality, commitments against Ukrainian membership of NATO, limits on Ukraine’s military relationship with the West, and a formula of multilateral security guarantees for Ukraine.

The war in Ukraine also obscures a decisive fact: the great problem of European security has now been solved from the standpoint of vital American interests. Today, no country can hope to bid for European hegemony – not even Russia in its pre-war strength. Europe has nuclear weapons and an economy six times that of Russia. It is absurd that Americans risk a war on two fronts, when one of the fronts can be managed by the Europeans. The US, facing increasing security demands in Asia, should force Europe to take charge. The America First platform should build pressure for greater European security spending and organize discussions on creating a European regional security architecture.

The road to this point passes through France, the only European state with the resources, confidence and ambition to organize and lead Europe as a third pole. The next Republican president should renew the old French-American partnership as a bridgehead for the transfer of European security responsibilities from American to European leadership. The transition must take place cooperatively and in phases, working towards an end state in which Europe can protect itself against all threats short of all-out great power war. To consolidate this process, the US must veto further expansion of NATO. The nuclear umbrella and intelligence sharing should be maintained for the time being, but the US should consider withdrawing from the joint NATO command structure to promote European autonomy. American foreign policy will be more disciplined, transatlantic ties more mature, and the international order more resilient if the big questions of European security are answered by Europeans themselves.

The Asia Challenge

The rise of China is America’s most demanding major strategic problem, but it is neither intractable nor an emergency. Although China is a powerful technological competitor and espionage threat, it is far from being able to politically subordinate or conquer Asia: it is surrounded by wealthy, confident, militarily capable states. The fact that nuclear weapons were invented at the height of American power in Asia imbues the status quo with a special tenacity. And the weight of the accumulation of China’s chronic economic problems will, in the long run, limit the resources the country can devote to geopolitical prizes. That said, China is and will remain a superpower. America First’s adequacy criterion therefore outweighs efforts to undermine its regime or restore U.S. military primacy in Asia. These goals are unattainable and pursuing them would create serious tensions that endanger the American people.